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Notes
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-ULTRA VIBES REGULATIONs-Plaintiff,
the purchaser of a home, was assigned his vendor's rights under
a contract with defendant for the eradication of termites. The
defendant, a duly licensed and bonded contractor under an act
creating the Pest Control Commission,' had complied with a
regulation of that commission requiring the giving of a bond for
the faithful performance of his contract. The plaintiff brought
suit for damages, alleging that defendant failed to comply
with the terms of the contract. The trial court gave judgment
for defendant and questioned the authority of the commission2
to make rules which add conditions to a section of the act author-
izing a general licensing bond.3 The court of appeal affirmed the
decree, holding that the act 4 did not authorize the Pest Control
Commission to require a bond to be furnished to the commission
guaranteeing the performance of the contract by the operator.
Melancon v. Mezell, 37 So. (2d) 52 (La. 1948).
The case presents a problem with reference to the effect to
be given administrative regulations which fail to fall within the
authorized scope of the statute creating the administrative body
and defining its functions and powers. The decision in the instant
case is in harmony with a trend in United States Supreme Court
decisions to regard such regulations as invalid, thus ultra vires
and without binding effect on the party to whom they apply. In
Addison v. Holly Hill-Fruit Products, Incorporated,5 the court
found no authority for an administrative interpretation of "area
of production," which served to exclude from the provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act 6 canneries which obtained all their
farm products from within ten miles and employed not more
than seven employees. The court concluded that the act restricted
the administrator to the "drawing of geographic lines" and that
the regulations exempting plants with seven employees were
1. La. Act 124 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §§ 146.15-146.24].
2. Under Section 1 of La. Act 124 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §
146.15], which provides for rules covering qualifications of applicants for a
license.
3. Id. at § 6 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 146.20].
4. Holding that Section 7 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 146.21] requiring
a contract entered into by the contractor and one engaging his services
to be in writing and its terms guaranteed for two years.
5. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 64 S.Ct. 1215,
88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944).
6. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1938).
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thus ultra vires. An act of Congress defined adulterated butter
as "any butter in the manufacture or manipulation of which any
process or material is used with intent or effect of causing the
absorption of abnormal quantities of water, milk or cream."
The Supreme Court held that this definition did not empower the
commissioner of internal revenue to declare butter adulterated
merely because it had sixteen per cent or more of moisture.7
In Work v. Mosiers a statute designed to prevent the misuse of a
minor's interest in Indian lands was held insufficient authority
for a regulation declaring that income is misused if not devoted
solely to the care and use of the minor, and alloting only fifty
dollars a month to the minor's parent, in the absence of a clear
showing that the funds were being used for his benefit. A decla-
ration of the secretary of the treasury excluding the import of
tea containing any coloring matter was held invalid under a sta-
tute establishing standards of "purity, quality, and fitness for
consumption of all kinds of tea imported." The problem is thus
one of statutory interpretation, for the Supreme Court reserves
to itself through its inherent judicial power the right to overrule
administrative declarations which deviate from the authority con-
ferred by the statutory provisions. 10 The court has recognized
and attached considerable importance to situations where the
statute is ambiguous and there has been a long and continuous
administration construction," especially if there has also been
a re-enactment of a statute without change, for the view is that
this is a recognition and approval of the particular construction
given the statutes.12 But where there is no uncertainty or am-
biguity in the statute and no long-continued administrative con-
7. Lynch v. Tilden Co., 265 U.S. 315, 44 S.Ct. 488, 68 L.Ed. 1034 (1924).
8. Work, Secretary of the Interior v. United States ex rel. Mosier, 261
U.S. 352, 43 S.Ct. 389, 67 L.Ed. 693 (1923).
9. Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606, 38 S.Ct. 395, 62 L.Ed. 892 (1918).
10. For a discussion of the problem generally, see The Supreme Court
on Administrative Construction as a Guide in the Interpretation of Statutes
(1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 469.
11. . . . when there has been a long acquiescence in a regulation, and
by it rights of parties have been determined and adjusted, it is not to be
disregarded without the most cogent and persuasive reasons." Robertson
v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 613, 8 S.Ct. 1328, 1330, 32 L.Ed. 269, 271 (1888).
See also National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 40 S.Ct. 237, 64
L.Ed. 496 (1920).
12. "And we have decided that the re-enactment by Congress, without
change, of a statute which had previously received long continued executive
construction is an adoption by Congress of such construction." United States
v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S. 337, 339, 28 S.Ct. 532, 533, 52 L.Ed.
821, 822 (1908).
See also United States v. G. Falk & Brother, 204 U.S. 143, 27 S.Ct. 191,
51 L.Ed. 411 (1907).
NOTES
struction, the courts have regarded unauthorized administrative
interpretations as invalid.13 The instant case is an illustration
of this principle, but it is believed that since the purpose of the
act is to protect the public the authority to require a bond might
well have been read into the statute.
ROBERT H. WILLIAMS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-WAIVER OF NOTIcE-REQUIRED BY STA-
TUTE-Relators, school bus operators of East Baton Rouge Parish
who had acquired tenure, were given notice to appear before the
school board for a hearing to determine whether they should
be dismissed upon the ground of wilful neglect of duty. On the
day set for the hearing these operators appeared with counsel
in the corridor of the courthouse, adjoining the room in which
the meeting was being held; however, they refused, upon re-
quest, to participate in the proceeding because the statutory re-
quirement that notice be given at least fifteen days in advance
of the hearing had not been complied with by the board. Lou-
isiana Act 185 of 1944 provides "that said School Bus Operator
shall be furnished by such school board at least fifteen days in
advance of said hearing, with a copy of the written grounds on
which removal or discharge is sought."' The relators argued that
the hearing was invalid because they had not received notice at
least fifteen days before the hearing. Held, that the operators'
appearance with counsel in the corridor of the courthouse es-
topped them from contending that notice was not given timely.2
State ex rel. Williams v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,
36 So. (2d) 832 (La. App. 1948).
Ordinarily, a deviation from the statutory form and manner
of giving notice may be a ground for invalidating the administra-
tive decision.3 The jurisdictions which require strict adherence
13. For other cases see Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. v. United States, 263
U.S. 528, 44 S.Ct. 194, 68 L.Ed. 427 (1924); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S.
245, 46 S.Ct. 248, 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926).
1. La. Act 185 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §2248]: "It is further
provided that said school bus operator shall be furnished by such school
board at least fifteen days in advance of the date of said hearing, with a
copy of the written grounds on which removal or discharge is sought. Said
school bus operator shall have the right to appear in his own behalf, and
with counsel of his own selection, all of whom shall be heard by the board
at said hearing; provided, further that it is not the intent of this act to
impair the right of appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction."
2. The court did not consider such technical contentions, as when the
fifteen days began to run and the exclusion of certain days in computing
the fifteen days.
3. See People v. Zoller, 337 Ill. 362, 169 N.E. 228 (1929), where the State
of Illinois insisted that if there were any defects in the procedure of giving
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